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Abstract
This paper explores the violent conflict between Le-
banese Maronite and Druze communities that took 
place in the years 1982-1984. Commonly referred to 
as Harb al-Jabal, or the War of the Mountains, this 
conflict occurred during the fifteen-year civil war in 
Lebanon (1975-1990). My paper addresses how both 
the Maronites and Druze employed forms of group 
memory to define the historical trajectories of their 
respective identities and the conflict between them. 
As part of ZMO’s and UMAM’s larger research pro-
ject Transforming Memories: Cultural Production and 
Personal/Public Memory in Lebanon and Morocco1, my 
study goes beyond a conventional historiography to 
explore how collective memory and forms of remem-
brance played a significant role in constituting com-
munity allegiance and inter-community conflict. 
While this paper consults established archival sour-
ces, I also use oral history to analyze the communi-
ties’ perceptions of themselves and each other. This 
study is informed by the assumption that postwar 
1 This project publication was generously supported with 
funds from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
reconciliation in Lebanon would be considerable 
enhanced by researching the relationship between 
»collective memory« and violence.   
Introduction
On 15 February 2009, the Druze chieftain and leader 
of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Joumblatt, 
was hosting a delegation of American journalists 
at his ancestral residence in Moukhtara.2 During a 
tour of his magnificent palace, Joumblatt was asked 
by one of his guests about a mural that stands in one 
of the many reception halls. In response Joumblatt 
posed before the mural, and explained: 
This is the sight of the French navy landing in 
1860 to punish my ancestors for killing the Ma-
ronites… However, a century later I took my re-
venge… [with a small laugh].
2 I was part of this delegation, which visited Joumblatt one 
day after the fourth anniversary of the assassination of former 
Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.
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A mural in one of the reception halls of the Moukhtara Palace, the ancestral residence of the Joumblatts, depicting the French 
and Ottoman Navy landing on the Lebanese coast to stop the ongoing massacres in 1860. Photo by Husam Harb
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derstood, as Salibi frames it, as being »a conflict 
between two tribes flying distinct historical flags 
with no common vision of their past.«6
These two distinct historical banners can be 
briefly summarized in two broad perceptions. The 
Druze perceived themselves as a proud warrior 
clan brought to this land to fend off the attacks 
of the Byzantines and their associates, known as 
the Mardaites or the Jarajimah, and later of the 
crusaders. More importantly, the Druze have for-
med their image of their Mount Lebanon neigh-
bors, the Maronites, in a way that depicts the lat-
ter group as insignificant peasants brought in to 
carry out chores unbefitting of warriors. On the 
other hand, the Maronites believed that they were 
native to this land, tracing their ancestry back to 
early Semitic peoples. The Maronites claimed that 
their nation was a melting pot of different civiliza-
tions (Arameans, Akkadians, and Canaanites) that 
inhabited the Lebanese coast and mountain and 
transformed it into a refuge from the oppressive 
Muslim invaders. After the defeat of their armies, 
out of necessity the Maronites forged an alliance 
with the Druze, who in turn wanted to maintain 
a certain autonomy from the Sunni orthodox cali-
phate, whose capital was first in Baghdad then in 
Istanbul. According to Walid Phares, this histori-
cal settlement was mutually beneficial. On the one 
hand, the Druze needed the labor provided by the 
Maronites to maintain their agrarian economy; on 
the other, the Maronites endured until the time 
was right to reclaim their rights.7 
Before moving on, however, it is important to 
discuss the somewhat controversial theme of col-
lective memory, which many scholars have viewed 
as illusory or perhaps even trope-like. Therefore, 
it is pertinent to trace the evolution of this concept 
and how it figures within my current project: how 
a sense of collectiveness shaped or augmented the 
conflict between the two communities in the event 
of Harb al-Jabal. I also want to discuss and outline 
my methodology and sources – most importantly 
oral history – in order to situate my study within 
memory studies on the Lebanese civil war.
Collective Memory: a theoretical framework
The concept »collective memory« first appeared 
in the writings of Hugo von Hofmannsthal in 1902. 
However, it was not until Maurice Halbwachs pu-
blished his book The Social Frameworks of Me-
mory in 1925, followed by his main work entitled 
On Collective Memory, that this concept became 
well-established in the realm of social science.8 
6 Ibid., 18.
7 Walid Phares, »The Historical Background of the War of 
the Mountains«, Al-Masira, 4 September 1984, 51.
8 Kerwin Lee Klein, »On the Emergence of Memory in His-
torical Discourse«, Representations, No. 69, Special Issue: 
Grounds for Remembering (Winter, 2000): 127.
Although Joumblatt said this with his usu-
al black humor, and his guests laughed along, it 
seemed that he meant every word of it, partly be-
cause he made an uninterrupted connection bet-
ween the events of 1860 and 1982, and because he 
himself possibly believed that to be the case. This 
is perhaps ample proof that the Lebanese history 
»attic,« as Lebanon’s foremost historian, Kamal 
Salibi, puts it, has not been properly swept and its 
elements have not yet seen the sunlight, which is 
crucially needed for the Lebanese to reconcile with 
their past and embrace their diversity. In what fol-
lows, I want to situate the debate on memory and 
reconciliation within the events of the War of the 
Mountains in Lebanon 1982–84 and to introduce 
a somewhat understudied period of the Lebanese 
civil war, whose ramifications go beyond the two 
communities directly involved in the War of the 
Mountains, the Druze and the Maronites, to include 
the entire country as well.
The following study is based on my PhD research 
on the War of the Mountains and the role that col-
lective memory played in forming the two commu-
nities’ perceptions of themselves and each other.3 
These two communities – the Druze being a hetero-
dox offshoot of Islam, and the Maronites an Eastern 
rite Catholic group – inhabited Mount Lebanon star-
ting as early as the 11th century, and both claim to 
be the founders of the Lebanese entity.
These perceptions were an important element in 
building up to the bloody confrontation commonly 
referred to as Harb al-Jabal. Salibi’s landmark work, 
A House of Many Mansions, dissects the formation 
of the collective memory formation of each of these 
communities. The Druze-Maronite enmity did not 
develop overnight, nor was it sectarian in nature or, 
as some might claim, the consequence of imperia-
lism and modernity.4 The enmity is a rather complex 
process dating back at least to the 17th century. 
Prior to the establishment of the Republic of Gre-
ater Lebanon in 1920, the Druze and the Maronites 
made up the majority of the inhabitants of Mount 
Lebanon. Before this period, according to Kamal 
Salibi, the history of Lebanon »essentially involves 
a Maronite-Druze story in which other Lebanese 
communities played only marginal roles, if any.«5 
The fact that the Druze and the Maronites both 
perceived themselves to be the proprietors of Leba-
non made them enter into a historic feud, with each 
side trying to prove that Lebanon is exclusively 
their own creation, thus subordinating the other 
side. This conflict, therefore, is perhaps better un-
3 This paper was delivered at the conference The Legacy of 
Kamal Salibi and was sponsored by the Fares Center for Eas-
tern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University, 20  April, 2012.
4 Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Commu-
nity, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
5 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of 
Lebanon Reconsidered (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988). 231.
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Abraham Lincoln and George Washington and how 
these individuals have been worked – or more spe-
cifically forged – into American National memory. 
The most striking criticism of memory studies 
came from within the realm of historical studies. 
Starting in the 19th century, historiographical 
scholarship moved towards anchoring the study of 
history in a more scientific framework; this trend, 
commonly referred to as the German school, 
sought objectivity in historical writing and relied 
heavily on primary written documentation. Natu-
rally, this excluded any role of memory in the newly 
founded historical profession. Historians frowned 
upon unwritten forms, especially memory, which 
is distorted by a number of factors; hence memory 
was labeled ahistorical.13 However, the somewhat 
recent debate on memory vs. history has taken a 
different turn. The prominent French historian 
Pierre Nora (1989) regards memory as the arch-
enemy of history. According to Nora, »memory re-
mains in a permanent evolution and is unconscious 
of its successive deformations, vulnerable to mani-
pulation«; history, on the other hand, »is an intel-
lectual secular production, calls for analysis and 
criticism… history is suspicious of memory, and 
its true mission is to suppress and destroy it.«14 
Peter Novick, another critic of the Halbwachsian 
discourse, strips collective memory of its histori-
cal trait, mainly because:
To understand something historically is to be 
aware of its complexity, to have sufficient de-
tachment to see it from multiple perspectives, 
to accept the ambiguities, including moral am-
biguities, of protagonists’ motives and behavior. 
Collective memory simplifies; sees events from 
a single, committed perspective; is impatient 
with ambiguities of any kind; reduces events to 
mythic archetypes.15  
Novick, who coincidently dismisses the so-
called »noble dream« of objectivity in historical 
research, stresses the following important trait of 
collective memory as it relates to forging a com-
mon identity for the group.  According to Novick, 
»Collective memory is understood to express some 
eternal or essential truth about the group, usually 
tragic. A memory, once established, comes to defi-
13 Georg Iggers, »The Role of Professional Historical 
Scholarship in the Creation and Distortion of Memory«, in 
Historical Perspectives on Memory, ed. Anne Ollila (Helsinki: 
Hakapaino Oy, 1999), 55. 
14 Nora as quoted in James V. Wertsch »Collective Memory«, 
in Memory in Mind and Culture, 125.
15 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1999): 3-4.
Halbwachs, an apprentice of Durkheim, stated that 
memories are both public and shareable and that 
memory is a product of remembering within a 
group rather than a subjective endeavor. By shifting 
the unit of analysis from the individual to both the 
individual and his or her social group, Halbwachs 
went against the Freudian model that was popular 
at the time. According to the Halbwachsian model, 
memory is transmitted – or rather constructed – by 
individuals as members of groups, and therefore: 
»there are as many collective memories in a soci-
ety as there were social groups.«9 Hence, the pro-
cess of remembering and forgetting is regulated 
by the interests, goals, and practices of the group, 
and essentially what memories one retains of the 
past are filtered through the medium of the group. 
Therefore, the fluidity of memory makes the past 
exclusively dependent on the present contexts; and 
in effect, trying to determine what really happe-
ned in the past is futile. 
Despite Halbwachs’ novel ideas, sociologists 
and researchers did not adopt his work until ye-
ars later.10 While some researchers adopted the 
Halbwachsian interpretation of collective memory, 
others found his analysis a bit problematic. One 
of the major criticisms of Halbwachs was that he 
takes away individual agency from remembran-
ce and makes the group an overpowering entity. 
Frederic Bartlett – deemed the father of modern 
memory studies – criticizes Halbwachs by clai-
ming that groups do not have memories, but rather 
individuals in groups do. However, Bartlett agrees 
with Halbwachs on the importance of the group in 
harnessing individual memory, affirming that »so-
cial organizations give a persistent framework into 
which all detailed recall must fit, and it very pow-
erfully influences both the manner and the matter 
of recall.«11 On the other hand, Barry Schwartz 
criticized Halbwachs for overstating change in the 
memory process, which ultimately makes the past 
somewhat vaguer than it really was. According to 
Schwartz, there is a dialectical relation between 
the past and the present, and memory can be un-
derstood through that lens of »continuities in our 
perception of the past across time and to the way 
that these perceptions are maintained in the face 
of social change.«12 Schwartz nevertheless drew 
on collective memory in his analysis of the com-
memoration of American historical figures such as 
9 Halbwachs as quoted in The Role of Memory in Ethnic 
Conflict, ed. Ed Cairns and Micheál Roe (New York: Palgra-
ve Macmillan, 2003), 11.
10 Ibid., 12.
11 Bartlett as quoted in James V. Wertsch, »Collective Me-
mory«, in Memory in Mind and Culture, ed. Pascal Boyer and 
James Wertsch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 118-119.
12 Schwartz as quoted in Patrick Devine Wright, »A The-
oretical Overview of Memory and Conflict«, in The Role of 
Memory in Ethnic Conflicts, ed. Cairns and Roe, 12.
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coining a different phrase would alienate or disen-
chant my interviewees.
Sources and Methodology of Oral History
The sources this project uses, which range from 
the more traditional secondary sources to the 
more untapped sources, primarily but not exclu-
sively oral history and Druze/Maronite party pu-
blications, aspire to enhance this symbiosis bet-
ween individuals and group memory and to reveal 
aspects of the story/stories that otherwise remain 
suppressed or simply untold. Alessandro Portelli, 
the famous historian, elaborates the uniqueness of 
this approach:
The first thing that makes oral history different, 
therefore, is that it tells us less about events as 
such than about their meaning. This doesn’t 
imply that oral history has no factual interest; 
interviews often reveal unknown events or unk-
nown aspects of known events, and always cast 
new light on unexplored sides of the daily life of 
the non-hegemonic classes.20
The use of oral history has been rare in most 
works dealing with the Lebanese civil war. Most 
of the recent works dealing with memory studies, 
such as those by Lucia Volk and Sune Haugbolle, 
do so from an anthropological approach that re-
lies on ethnography, a cousin of oral history.21 
Furthermore, all the existent works deal to some 
extent with post-war Lebanon and rarely explo-
re the conflict and the role of memory in the ac-
tual war, focusing more on post-war implications. 
While at this phase in my project the oral history 
interviews conducted remain somewhat limited, 
they are sufficient (alongside other available sour-
ces) to reconstruct the events of Harb al-Jabal and 
to ask about the extent to which memories were 
a crucial element in the conflict. Ultimately, this 
project will explore how collective memory or me-
mories, or their lack in certain cases, can be a 
hindrance to grass-root reconciliation.22 While 
sources pertaining to the Lebanese civil war do 
exist in various outlets ranging from private coll-
ections to institutional libraries, none of these 
collections focus exclusively on the war, as most 
are incomplete. However, the UMAM archive, 
20 Alessandro Portelli, »On the Peculiarities of Oral History,« 
History Workshop, 12 (1981), 99.
21 Lucia Volk, Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Sune Haug-
bolle, War and Memory in Lebanon (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).
22 http://www.zmo.de/forschung/projekte_2008/Makram_
Lebanon_e.html. This project will include a wide array of 
interviews that will cover elite and non-elite as well as gen-
der perspectives.
ne that eternal truth, and, along with it, an eternal 
identity, for the members of the group.«16 
It is exactly these eternal/essential truths that 
make collective memory problematic in the con-
text of the Druze-Maronite encounters, as »the 
memorializing of tragedies or perhaps victories 
committed against ones’ group might lead to 
creating hostile feeling.«17 Moreover, as this pa-
per will demonstrate, when collective memory is 
left unaddressed within a divided society such as 
that of Lebanon, it can prevent post-war reconcili-
ation and perhaps ignite dormant hostilities; this 
was the case in 1860, 1958, and 1975–90. The War 
of the Mountains, as will be demonstrated, is a 
striking example of this claim. 
While I do make use of the term collective me-
mory throughout this study, rather than terms 
such as social memory or memory cultures,18 my 
approach to the realm of memory does not adopt 
the strict Halbwachsian model. I rather subscribe 
to the notion that although memory is framed by 
the group – in this case, the religious sect or the 
tribe – individuals are still the vessels in which 
the act or remembrance occurs, even if these are 
individuals who identify with a certain group. 
Amos Funkenstein staunchly places the individual 
in the middle of this debate, affirming that:
Consciousness and memory can only be realized 
by an individual who acts, is aware, and remem-
bers. Just as a nation cannot eat or dance, neit-
her can it speak or remember. Remembering is 
a mental act, and therefore it is absolutely and 
completely personal.19 
While the individual, and not groups, does in-
deed remember, the meanings of these memories 
are interpreted or recast by the group to serve a 
certain purpose. This is precisely the sense of the 
term collective memory that informs my project.
Another reason for the usage of this term is that 
the concept of collective memory, or its Arabic 
translation al-Zakira al-Jamaʿaiya, resonates more 
with the people in my oral history interviews, and 
16 Novick as quoted in James V. Wertsch »Collective Me-
mory«, in Memory in Mind and Culture, 126.
17 Graig Blatz & Michael Ross, »Historical Memories«, in 
Memory in Mind and Culture, ed. Pascal Boyer and James 
Wertsch, 230.
18 Some authors, such as Frentress and Wickham, have 
opted to use the term social memory rather than collecti-
ve memory, despite their acknowledgment that at times 
this usage might apply to Halbwachs’ collective memory as 
such. James Fentress, and Chris Wickham, Social Memory 
(Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992).
19 Amos Funkenstein, »Collective Memory and Historical 
Consciousness,« History & Memory 1, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 
1989): 6.
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Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Maronite mi-
litia, and Walid Joumblatt, the head of the Druze, 
were born in 1947 and 1949, respectively. The 
anti-National Pact sentiment was a central theme 
in Bashir Gemayel’s political rhetoric; he made it 
clear that »the 1943 formula has been buried and 
we have placed a tombstone on the grave, and we 
have stationed a guard [over this grave] so it will 
not be resurrected.«24 Walid Joumblatt’s senti-
ments were not very different; he made it abun-
dantly clear that Lebanon was molded to please 
the Maronites, and that not until true reform was 
achieved [de-Maronification] would the war in Le-
banon truly come to an end.25 
All the interviewees I have met so far affirmed 
that the events of what was popularly called »the 
1958 revolution« contributed in more than one way 
to the shaping of their own and their communities’ 
collective memories.26 In this respect, age is extre-
mely important in the molding of collective memo-
ry. Social scientists have concluded that historical 
events that are either witnessed or related to the 
right cohort are usually well remembered.27 Studies 
conducted by Rubin,  Wetzler, and Nebes, conclude 
that individuals between the ages of 13–25 are the 
group most likely to retain and pass on memory. 
Hassan al-Beaini, a former Lebanese army officer 
and a commander in the PSP militia during Harb 
al-Jabal, vividly recalls his father’s exploits during 
the 1958 Revolution. Beaini specifically remem-
bers how his father had to »walk to the Lebanese-
Syrian border to get weapons for the village and 
how, upon his father’s return, he brought him to 
the village square and made him fire a weapon in 
the air.«28 Such watershed experiences were not 
limited to Beaini or his community, but were also 
shared by the Maronites elsewhere. Elie Hobei-
ka, the leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF) whose 
name was directly associated with the Sabra and 
Shatila massacre in 1982, shares a similar experi-
ence, which scarred him as an adolescent. Hobei-
ka, interviewed by Ghassan Charbel, relates how in 
1970 at the age of 14 he witnessed pro-Palestinian 
elements vandalizing his apartment building and 
assaulting a Lebanese police officer in his neigh-
borhood in the heart of East Beirut. According to 
Hobeika, this was a watershed moment in his life 
and that of his classmates, who felt that they were 
in immediate danger. This made them decide to join 
24 As quoted by Karim Pakradouni, al-Jazeera documenta-
ry The War of Lebanon (Harb Lubnan), aired 2001.
25 Al-Anba ,ʾ 18 April 1983.
26 The only interviewee born outside this time scope is Dr 
George Freiha, Bashir Gemayel’s chief-of-staff, January 2012.
27 These studies were conducted by D. C. Rubin, S. E. Wetz-
ler, and R. D. Nebes (1986). »Autobiographical memory ac-
ross the adult lifespan«, in Autobiographical Memory, ed. D. 
C. Rubin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 202-221.  
28 Interview with retired General Hassan al-Beaini, Virgi-
nia, USA, Feb  2010.
which this project extensively utilizes, contains a 
wide array of primary as well as secondary sour-
ces, ranging from newspapers, periodicals to poli-
tical party publications and communiqués, which I 
draw on throughout this study.
The »1958 generation«
The first major confrontation between the Druze 
and the Maronites in post-independence Lebanon 
was in 1958, in what was labeled a mini-civil war. 
In 1952, the Socialist Front led by Kamal Joumblatt 
was successful in ousting the first president of the 
republic, Bishara al-Khuri, and replacing him with 
a member of the front, Camille Chamoun, the se-
cond president of the Lebanese Republic. Shortly 
afterwards, Joumblatt and Chamoun’s alliance fell 
apart and transformed into a bitter animosity. The 
Druze perceived this as yet another episode of be-
trayal, as it brought forward memories of Bashir 
II’s betrayal of Bashir Joumblatt in the 19th centu-
ry. Furthermore, the fact that Chamoun was from 
the town of Deir al-Qamar, which the Druze sacked 
in 1860, provided both sects with ample material 
to use in their collective remembrance. 
However, the two main sides to the conflict, na-
mely the Druze and the Maronites, mainly viewed 
these events as an additional chapter in their coll-
ective memory of conflicts.  One of the major out-
comes of this conflict was the generation of young 
men and women who saw in the 1958 crisis suf-
ficient proof that coexistence within the current 
political system was not viable. The majority of the 
people who constituted the cadres of the different 
militias in 1975, and more so in 1982, were around 
the age of ten in 1958 and recall this event as an 
important juncture in the subsequent war. Subse-
quently, this »1958 generation« did not endorse 
al-Mithaq l-Wataniyy (the National Pact) that was 
forged among the founders of the 1943 republic.23
The Muslims (the Druze, Sunnis, and Shiʿites) 
found the pact inequitable because it gave the Ma-
ronite minority unrestricted control over the coun-
try. On the other hand, the Maronites saw that 
their Christian homeland was threatened by vari-
ous factors and therefore no longer sustainable un-
der the provisions of the pact. Coincidently, all the 
individuals interviewed for this study so far, except 
one, were born between the years of 1940–1958. 
23 Under the provisions of this pact, the Maronites would 
not seek foreign intervention, but would accept Lebanon as 
an »Arab«-affiliated country, rather than a »Western« one, 
while the Muslims were to abandon their aspirations to 
unite with Syria. The President of the Republic was always 
to be Maronite, the Prime Minister always to be Sunni, the 
Speaker always to be Shiʿa, the deputy speaker of the Parli-
ament always to be Greek Orthodox. All public offices were 
to be in a ratio of 6:5 in favor of Christians to Muslims. 
Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc, 1966): 276.
6ZMO Working Papers 7 · M. Rabah · The War of the Mountains in Lebanon 1982–1984 · 2013
Editor-in-Chief of al-ʿAmal newspaper (the mouth-
piece of the Maronite Kataʾeb party), echoed the 
frustration and the hatred of the displaced Chris-
tians towards the Joumblatti faction. Abu-Khalil, 
a native of Beit al-Din – the village of Bashir II – 
violently criticized the Joumblatti attempt to esta-
blish a Druze Canton, which started with »Kamal 
Joumblatt’s 1958 coup and continues, till this date, 
with his son Walid«.31 
On 18 June, twelve days after the start of the 
Israeli invasion, a LF convoy made its way to the 
Chouf Mountains, effectively starting the chain re-
action that was to become Harb al-Jabal. Before dis-
patching his soldiers to the mountain, their leader 
Bashir al-Gemayel stood on the hood of a jeep and 
gave his men instructions for the mission ahead. 
George Radi, an LF soldier and a native of Dar al-
Haref in the Maten region, was present that day at 
the barracks of Ain al-Remanh in the southern su-
burbs of Beirut. He was listening carefully to the 
words of the Kaʾed (Leader). Gemayel, addressing 
a select group of LF Military Police and Special 
Forces units, reminded them of the following.
May God forgive them [his opponents] for what 
they did; nevertheless we will turn over a new 
page. We are confident that Lebanon’s 6000 
years of history will never disappear and that 
we will rebuild a stronger and a more beautiful 
Lebanon. Today, a new Lebanon is born and it 
will not resemble in any way the old Lebanon 
of 1943, which was based on indifference and 
dubiousness… we need to forget the old institu-
tions, as we will not allow for a weak judiciary 
or a parliament full of brokers and wheelers and 
dealers… Tomorrow you will return to your villa-
ges to find statues commemorating the martyrs 
of the Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party [your opponents]. You will also 
find your houses burnt and demolished. I tell 
you from now on, your duty is to protect our foes 
regardless of what they have done to us in the 
past… There are some people we fought for the 
past eight years all across Lebanon, these peo-
ple have blown up our houses and desecrated 
the tombs of our ancestors. But today we have 
to respect their dead; they might have bombed 
our houses but we will protect theirs. They have 
insulted our rituals but we will respect theirs, 
they have expelled us from our homes but we 
will keep them in theirs. Now is the time to take 
back the initiative and to reclaim our rightful 
place in the Mashriq (Levant)...32
31 Al-ʿAmal, 17 March 1983.
32 Al-Nahar, 19 June 1982.
the Phalangist party and other similar factions.29 
These memories, however, were not sufficient on 
their own; other elements, such as group interest, 
fuel and direct these memories so as to mobilize 
and in this case militarize the community. 
On the eve of the Lebanese civil war these men 
and women had been subjected to a wide range 
of indoctrinations by various institutions, ranging 
from their parties and schools to their families and 
most importantly their sect. It was against this 
background that the events of Harb al-Jabal trans-
pired. While it is beyond the scope of the current 
paper to explore these institutions and methods, 
the overall project will address them at length.
Harb al-Jabal: 1982–1983
Prior to the Israeli invasion, the southern parts of 
Mount Lebanon (Chouf and Aley) had to some ex-
tent remained outside the scope of the civil war. 
However, on 16 March 1977, Kamal Joumblatt was 
assassinated by unknown assailants a few miles 
from his ancestral home in the Chouf. Joumblatt’s 
murder unleashed a series of Druze reprisals 
against innocent Christians, some of whom, ironi-
cally, were card-carrying members of Joumblatt’s 
party. In fact, a large majority of the Christians in 
the Chouf were followers of the Joumblatt family, 
while the remaining minority supported Camille 
Chamoun, the former President of the Republic. 
As prominent feudal lords of parts of Mount Le-
banon, the Joumblatts extended their patronage 
to all of the inhabitants of the Chouf – the Druze, 
the Maronites, and the Sunni – and thus transcen-
ded these sects. However, the aggressors did not 
take political affiliation into account and prefer-
red to see the conflict as sectarian and tribal. The 
Druzes who committed these atrocities were ba-
sically fueled by two considerations. Despite the 
alleged Syrian involvement in Joumblatt’s murder, 
it was the Maronites who solicited Syrian mili-
tary intervention in 1976; therefore, Maronites 
were regarded as guilty by association. Second, in 
1975, the Christians committed a number of mas-
sacres against the Palestinians in refugee camps 
in Tel al-Zaʿtar and Karantina, in addition to the 
Black Saturday massacre in which Christian mili-
tias executed civilians based on their ID cards.30 
The Druze massacres prompted a wave of Christi-
an migration from Mount Lebanon to the eastern 
parts of the country, which were by then a purely 
Christian region. To many of these refugees, the 
Israeli invasion brought them one step closer to 
returning to their villages and homes, which they 
had left five years earlier. Joseph Abu-Khalil, the 
29 Elie Hobeika as interviewed by the journalist Ghassān 
Charbal, Ayna kunta fī al-ḥarb?: iʻtirāfāt jinirālāt al-ṣirāʻāt al-
Lubnānīyah, Īlī Ḥubayqah, Samīr Jaʻja ,ʻ Walīd Junblāṭ, Mīshāl 
ʻAwn. Beirut: Riyāḍ al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr, 2011.
30 Ibid.
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Also present on that day was ES, a high-ranking 
LF intelligence officer. Reflecting on Bashir’s speech 
that day, ES believed that what was being asked of 
the Shabab (troops) was virtually impossible to car-
ry out. Despite Gemayel’s conviction that his strong, 
25,000-troop militia was a professional and discipli-
ned army, the reality was somewhat different. 
The LF contingent dispatched to the Mountain 
was composed of two kinds of men. The first group 
of fighters comprised soldiers native to Mount 
Lebanon who had been displaced from their ho-
mes and villages after 1977 and who had grown up 
with the collective memory of their ancestors being 
massacred by the Druze. The second breed of figh-
ters was totally alien to the mountain, but they had 
lost loved ones and comrades and merely wanted 
revenge. Surprisingly, it was the latter group who 
aggravated the situation, mainly because they had 
no understanding or respect to the particularities 
of the region and thus committed unspeakable 
acts against the Druze. According to ES, Bashir’s 
speech on that day did not have »double meanings, 
Bashir literally meant what he said, however, the 
people listening to him had double feelings.«33 Not 
only the populace but also the higher echelons of 
both the Druze and the Maronite communities 
were driven by these mixed feelings.
Bashir vs. Walid
On 20 June, one day after the LF militia entered 
the Chouf Mountains, Gemayel and Joumblatt met 
at the presidential palace in Baʿbda. The President 
of the Republic at the time, Elias Sarkis, convened 
a »Salvation Committee«, which included represen-
tatives of the major sects, to discuss the question of 
the Israeli invasion and its repercussions.34 Prior to 
this meeting, the two young warlords had never met 
before but had been exchanging messages through 
a network of interlocutors, at least since 1980. Be-
fore the committee convened, these two had a side 
meeting that lasted for 45 minutes. According to 
the classified minutes of this meeting, Gemayel 
had asked Joumblatt for his support to be elected 
President. Joumblatt was also asked to help end 
the military invasion by convincing his allies, the 
Palestinians, to surrender.35 In return, Joumblatt 
was offered the chance to become the second man 
in the republic, answerable only to the President. 
According to George Freiha, Bashir’s Chief-of-
Staff, Joumblatt’s cooperation was extremely im-
portant for the success of their project. Gemayel 
in fact wanted to reinstate the pre-1840 Maroni-
33 Interview with ES. He said this verbatim. Beirut, Lebanon, 
January 2010. This person requested anonymity  
34 The Committee was made up of Prime Minister Shafiq 
al-Wazzan, Foreign Minister Fuʾad Butrus, Bashir Gemayel, 
Walid Joumblatt, Nabih Berri (leader of the Shiʿite Amal Mo-
vement) and Nasri al-Maʿluf. See Al-Nahar, 20 June 1982.  
35 Interview with an LF official who requested anonymity.
tes-Druze alliance, whereby the Muslim parts of 
Lebanon, namely Tripoli, the Muslim South, and 
Bekaʿ excluding Zahleh, were to be returned to 
Syria.36 Down the centuries, the Maronites have 
always harbored some sort of delusion that the 
Druze shared their Lebanese national aspiration 
and therefore a return to the Lebanese Emirate 
was plausible.37
The blunt manner in which Bashir addressed 
Joumblatt stems from the fact that, one month be-
fore the Israeli invasion, Joumblatt had relayed to 
Bashir's emissary his willingness to avoid any con-
frontation in Mount Lebanon. However, the first 
meeting between the two ended with no tangible 
results. Joumblatt, perhaps, would have considered 
Gemayel’s proposal, which would have empowered 
the Druze politically and given them a bigger share 
of the Lebanese state. However, given Joumblatt’s 
political rhetoric in that period, it is presumable 
that the memory of the 19th century did not fit well 
into his collective memory and that of the Druzes. 
Any reference to this era evoked images of Maro-
nite treachery and the persecution of Joumblatt’s 
grandfathers, and more specifically the Bashir 
Joumblatt incident mentioned earlier. On the other 
hand, the Maronites were well aware of this reality 
and made it abundantly clear that they would never 
trust the Druze. Interestingly, a common Lebanese 
proverb preaches this line, as it says »Have lunch 
at a Druze’s but only sleep-over at a Christian’s«, 
stressing that the Druze are treacherous by nature. 
We can safely presume that this proverb was not 
created nor propagated by the Druze, but was rather 
the perception of their Maronite counterparts. An 
article that appeared in al- Aʿmal newspaper entitled 
»Walid Joumblatt and the Bashir Gemayel Complex« 
might serve to underscore this point. This one-page 
feature story speaks of how Walid Joumblatt, ever 
since his tribal appointment to the Joumblatti clan, 
had harbored resentments against the Maronites 
and particularly Bashir Gemayel. According to the 
article, this is a trait he inherited from his father. 
But the most important point that the author Wa-
lid, the penname of Nabil Khalefh, makes is the fol-
lowing: 
The name »Bashir« has always been problematic 
to the Joumblatt family because it reminds them 
of the end of their feudalism and Bashir II. Now 
the Maronites, under the leadership of Bashir 
Gemayel, have proved that they can transform 
into a fighting Spartan community and not only 
remain businessmen and men of letters.38
36 Interview with George Freiha. Beirut, Lebanon, January 
2010.
37 Salibi, 205.
38 Al-ʿAmal, 4 July 1982, »Walid Joumblatt and the Bashir 
Gemayal Complex: a reading into Joumblatt’s political stances 
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any clear instructions from the Party (PSP) to 
engage the Lebanese Forces, but we knew what 
should be done. I was defending my land and my 
dignity, just like my father did in 1958 and my 
great-grandfather before him in 1860.41
This uninterrupted association of the circum-
stances of 1860 and 1958 with those of 1982 within 
both communities was made possible through the 
process of collective remembrance, thus making 
the possibility of a peaceful settlement rather slim, 
even nonexistent. Such continuities are enhan-
ced by many media, which range from the family 
household to schools.
Despite this military setback in al-Qubay ,ʿ 
Bashir was undeterred. On 21 August 1982, as 
part of the settlement brokered by US special en-
voy to Lebanon Philip Habib, the PLO began its 
evacuation of the besieged capital. Two days la-
ter, the Lebanese Parliament convened under the 
protection of the Israeli army and elected Bashir 
the seventh President of the Lebanese Republic. 
Bashir’s election, at least to the Maronites, was 
not just a political conquest; it was rather a reclai-
ming of a strong Lebanon capable of protecting the 
Christians of the East. More importantly, Bashir’s 
presidency was the culmination of the resistance 
that started in the 7th century with the Mardaites, 
thus fitting perfectly within the framework of the 
Maronites’ collective memory process. Abbot Bulus 
Naʿaman, head of the permanent congress of the 
Lebanese monastic orders and considered Bashir’s 
ideological mentor, saw in Gemayel’s election the 
realization of a long-awaited dream that spanned 
many generations.42 This dream, however, was 
short-lived, as the President-elect was assassinated 
and with him the dream of Lebanon. 
Almost a month after Bashir’s election, the par-
liament reconvened under similar circumstances, 
and elected Amin Gemayel the new President of 
Lebanon. Amin, the eldest son of Pierre Gemayel, 
the founder of the Phalangist party, differed grea-
tly from his younger brother Bashir. Amin, a mem-
ber of the Lebanese Parliament, which his brother 
Bashir described as an assembly of wheeler-dealers 
(see Bashir’s speech earlier), fully espoused the 
1943 formula. According to George Freiha, Amin’s 
Chief-of-Staff, Israel had agreed to support Amin’s 
candidacy, provided that he honored Bashir’s com-
mitments by signing a peace treaty between the 
two countries. However, Amin did not abide by this 
promise, and this had terrible repercussions on the 
Maronites, as will be demonstrated later. These 
factors placed him at odds with the so-called 1958 
41 Ibid.
42 Antoun Saad, Man, Country, Freedom: The Memoirs of 
Bulus Naʿaman (Beirut: Entire East publications, 2009): 469.
On 27 June, seven days after their meeting, 
Joumblatt replied to Bashir’s proposal. The Druze 
militia, who so far had refrained from any open 
military confrontation with the Israeli army, am-
bushed the LF who were making their way to the 
Beirut-Damascus highway. During the course of 
this nine-day battle in the village of al-Qubay ,ʿ 
Ernest Gemayel, Bashir’s nephew and the com-
mander of the LF contingent, was killed.39  Ac-
cording to the Druze commander of the battle of 
al-Qraya, this victory went beyond tactical con-
siderations, which were mainly to prevent the LF 
from linking up with their forces in the southern 
parts of Mount Lebanon. It was rather a fight for 
»existence and dignity.«40 For this 28-year-old 
Druze fighter, it was clear that the duty at hand 
was his family’s legacy and that he was just doing 
what his ancestors did in 1958 and 1860:
My father, who had fought with the rebels in 
1958, died next to me during the battle and so 
did a number of my cousins… We did not have 
based on a psycho-sociological historical interpretation.« 
The article also featured a relatively small picture of Walid 
Joumblatt with the subtitle »the remnant of old Lebanon« 
while above it in the center lay a big picture of Bashir Gemayel 
with the subtitle »the new face of Lebanon«.
39 Al-Nahar, 27 June 1982.
40 Interview with PSP Military Commander who requested 
anonymity. Beirut, Lebanon, December 2009.
Al-ʿAmal, 4 July 1982, »Walid Joumblatt and the Bashir Ge-
mayal Complex: a reading into Joumblatt’s political stances 
based on a psycho-sociological historical interpretation.« 
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describes the perilous task that was assigned to 
them as the »Passing of the Crucifix« on their Via 
Dolorosa.45 
Published in 1983 directly after the end of the 
battles, Andari’s memoirs record the events and 
military confrontations of Harb al-Jabal. More im-
portantly, these memoirs depict the LF fighters’ 
state of mind and perhaps their collective memory 
formation. Based on an analysis of these memoirs, 
Andari and Geagea, both from the North of Leba-
non, appear to share the same collective memory 
of the 1860 war, as well as the so-called Maronite 
myth that defines their community. However, in a Ja-
nuary 2010 interview, Andari affirms that the 1860 
events were not present in his group’s psyche, while 
in fact an examination of his book proves otherwi-
se.46 Andari, for example, describes his entry into 
the town of Deir al-Qamar with »it’s Saray [palace], 
which has remained unchanged since the dawn 
of the 1860 massacre… imprinted on its walls are 
the shadows of the [Druze] attackers, with their 
striped robes and black trousers.«47 The historical 
background Andari provides for the 1983 war mat-
ches what was earlier described as the Maronite 
historical banner.
Within the span of two days, 4–6 September 
1982, both the Druze and the Maronites fought 
to redeem 123 years of their history. On the one 
hand, the Druze aspired to repeat their 1860 vic-
tory; on the other, the Maronites wanted to avoid 
their ancestors’ debacle. The military victory of 
the Druze led to the destruction of over 60 villa-
ges and to the displacement of the entire Chris-
tian population of southern Mount Lebanon. The 
war also saw some of the most atrocious massac-
res, which, along with the destruction of the villa-
ges and the displacement of the population, were 
similar to and perhaps as atrocious as the 1860 
events.
The official end of the Lebanese civil war in 
1990 saw the start of the return of the Christians 
of Mount Lebanon to their destroyed villages and 
towns; however, a true reconciliation process in 
which the two sides openly expose their historical 
banner and agree on a common dominator remains 
pending.
45 Paul Andari, Al-Jabal: Haqīqah lā Tarḥam (The Mountain: 
A Ruthless Reality) (unidentified publisher: 1983): 59. Andari 
draws parallels to the Via Dolorosa Jesus Christ undertook on 
his way to the crucifix. 
46 Interview with Paul Andari. Adma, Lebanon, January 
2010.
47 Ibid, 11.
generation, which comprised the majority of his 
community, including the 25,000-strong LF. 
However, the Druze recognized neither the legi-
timacy of the new president nor the fact that he 
did not necessarily share his brother’s political 
vision. The PSP media outlets launched an all-out 
attack against Amin and accused him of trying 
to establish a monarchy. Sawt al-Jabal (Voice of 
the Mountain), the PSP’s radio station, constantly 
referred to Amin as »the Shah of Baʿbda«, and to 
the Lebanese Army under his command as »the 
army of the ruling family.«43 This perception of 
Amin Gemayel as a despot and an extension of his 
brother was integrated into the Druze collective 
psyche, consequently adding to their resentment 
of the Maronites. More importantly, an examina-
tion of the Druze rhetoric during that period (Fall 
1982 to Fall 1983) lucidly exhibits their fear of 
annihilation at the hands of what they conside-
red the neo-Crusaders. Walid Joumblatt’s inter-
view with Newsweek Magazine summarizes this 
fear and, beyond that, so the extent to which the 
Druze were willing to go to avoid it becoming a 
reality:
We are now in a state of war with the Isolatio-
nists [Lebanese Forces] who are responsible for 
the massacres of Sabra and Shatila and Tel al-
Zaʿtar, among others. They want to do the same 
thing to the Druze. However, I will not allow my 
people to be butchered at the hands of the Pha-
langist, no matter what the price is.44 
Joumblatt’s hardline position, and also that of 
»his people«, radicalized after he narrowly es-
caped an assassination attempt that destroyed his 
convoy, injured his wife, and killed one of his bo-
dyguards. The sight of their young leader rushed 
to the hospital, disoriented and bleeding, affirmed 
for the Druze that their existence was indeed at 
stake. The fears of both communities were further 
reinforced by a number of domestic events. After 
the death of Bashir, the LF started to send rein-
forcements into the Chouf region and to establish 
military barracks and LF chapters. On 6 January 
1983, the LF dispatched Samir Geagea along with 
200 fighters from the North to the Chouf Moun-
tains. Geagea, a former medical student at the 
American University of Beirut, acquired a repu-
tation for being efficient and ruthless during his 
command of the LF units in the North of Leba-
non. Paul Andari, Geagea’s second-in-command, 
43 The Voice of the Mountain radio-station, one-year anni-
versary of Harb al-Jabal.
44 As quoted in al-Anba ,ʾ 6 June 1983. It is interesting that 
Joumblatt refers to the Druze as »my people« rather than 
»my sect.«
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